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21. INTRODUCTION
Starting from Strotz (1956), choice problems with dynamically inconsistent prefer-
ences have been studied extensively1. There is a small but growing literature that
studies the properties of competitive equilibriummodels with dynamically inconsis-
tent and time-separable preferences2. The representative agent economy is a partic-
ularly simple (and widely used) model in macroeconomics and finance where both
issues of optimization and market clearing arise3. This paper shows the robust non
existence of competitive equilibria even in a simple deterministic three period repre-
sentative agent economy with dynamically inconsistent preferences.
We distinguish between a naive and sophisticated representative agent. We for-
mulate the decision problem of a sophisticated representative agent as a intra-personal
game at given prices. In our simple exchange economy there is only one candidate
market clearing allocation, namely one in which the representative agent consumes
his endowments. We show, via a robust example, that there are no prices such that,
at the solution of the intra-personal game, the representative agent consumes his
endowments.
Preferences in our example do not satisfy the assumption of time separability4,
an essential feature of related work where equilibrium existence is not an issue. In
our example dynamically inconsistent preferences result in induced preferences over
choices in first period markets that are non convex and satiated. We show that this
combination of non convexity and satiation implies that the market clearing alloca-
tion does not lie in the convex hull of demand even allowing for negative prices.
Finally, with a naive representative agent, we show that perfect foresight is incom-
patible with market clearing and individual optimization.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In section 2 we introduce the three
period representative agent economy, in section 3 we present the non existence ex-
ample with a sophisticated representative agent, while in section 4 we study exis-
tence with a naive representative agent.
1Pollak (1968), Blackorby, Nissen, Primont, and Russell (1973), Peleg and Yaari (1973), Goldman
(1980), Harris and Laibson (2001), Caplin and Leahy (2006) among others.
2Barro (1999), Kocherlakota (2001), Luttmer andMariotti (2003), Luttmer andMariotti (2006), Herings
and Rohde (2006), Luttmer and Mariotti (2007).
3Caplin and Leahy (2001), Kocherlakota (2001), Luttmer andMariotti (2003), among others, introduce
dynamically inconsistent preferences in the representative agent economy.
4Observe that preferences which satisfy quasi-hyperbolic discounting (Laibson (1997)) are by con-
struction time separable.
32. THE ECONOMY
We consider a simple representative agent economy over three periods, labeled by
t, t = 1, 2, 3. There is a single asset (the tree) which delivers units of a consumption
good (dividends or fruit) in every period. The consumption good is non storable,
hence the asset provides the only way to transfer wealth across periods. Let ct denote
consumption in period t, t = 1, 2, 3. Let θt+1 denote the amount of the asset held by
the representative agent at the beginning of period t + 1. Then θt+1dt+1 denotes the
amount of the consumption good available for consumption at t+ 1.
We assume the representative agent is a price taker for both the consumption good
and the asset. We normalize prices so that the price of the consumption good is fixed
at 1 in each period, with pt denoting the relative price of the asset in period t. The
model is completely deterministic and the values of all fundamentals are known
from the beginning by the agent. At the beginning of period 1, the agent is endowed
with the entire asset (θ1 = 1) and the entire paid dividend d1.
At each t, we assume that the agent has preferences ranking non negative com-
modity bundles. We assume that at each t, t = 1, 2, the preferences of the representa-
tive agent over consumption are represented by the utility function ut(ct, ..., c3). We
assume that at each t, t = 1, 2 ut(ct, ..., c3) is smooth, strictly increasing and strictly
quasi-concave.
We say preferences are dynamically inconsistent if the projection of preferences of
the representative agent at t = 1 over (c2, c3) ∈ R2+ are different from his preferences
at t = 2 over (c2, c3) ∈ R2+, or equivalently
∂u1
∂c3
(c1,c2,c3)
∂u1
∂c2
(c1,c2,c3)
6=
∂u2
∂c3
(c2,c3)
∂u2
∂c2
(c2,c3)
, for all non negative
c1, c2, c3.
5
In the remainder of the paper we assume that the preferences of the representative
agent are dynamically inconsistent.
We consider the case where the representative agent is sophisticated, i.e. correctly
anticipates that at t = 2 he will re-optimize, given his choices made at t = 1. At given
prices pt, t = 1, 2, the decision problem of the sophisticated representative agent is
described by the following intra-personal game:
Players: each period t, t = 1, 2, the representative agent is considered as a dis-
tinct autonomous player.
5As preferences are monotonic over consumption in each period, the optimal period 3 choice is to
always choose maximum feasible consumption. It follows that the asset price in period 3 is zero. In
this 3 period economy our exclusive focus is on the time inconsistency between periods 1 and 2.
4Actions: At = {(ct, θt+1) ∈ R2+ : ct + ptθt+1 ≤ (pt + dt)θt.} constitutes the set of
actions available to player t.
Histories: the set of possible histories at t = 2 is H1 = A1, while the set of
histories at t = 1 is a singleton.
Strategies: a strategy for the date t consumer is a Borel measurable function
γt : Ht−1 → ∆(At).
Definition 1. A sophisticated solution (SS) is a strategy combination γ such that for
each t = 1, 2 and each history ht−1 ∈ Ht−1, the period-t consumer cannot increase
her utility ut() in the subgame ht−1 by using a strategy other than γt.
Remark. From definition 1, at given prices, it follows that a SS is a subgame perfect
Nash equilibrium of the intra-personal game, although, in general, the converse is
not necessarily. However in our economy as the second period utility is strictly
quasi-concave, the two solution concepts coincide.
The market clearing condition for this economy is trivial: the agent must hold the
entire unit of the asset in each period (θ1 = θ2 = θ3 = 1) and consumption must be
equal to the entire paid dividend in each period (c1 = d1, c2 = d2, c3 = d3).
Definition 2. A competitive equilibrium with a sophisticated representative agent is a com-
bination of prices (p∗1, p
∗
2) and allocations (θ
∗
1, c
∗
1, θ
∗
2, c
∗
2, θ
∗
3, c
∗
3) such that:
(i) (θ∗1, c
∗
1, θ
∗
2, c
∗
2, θ
∗
3, c
∗
3) is the outcome of SS at prices (p
∗
1, p
∗
2)
(ii) (c∗1 = d1, θ
∗
2 = 1, c
∗
2 = d2, θ
∗
3 = 1, c
∗
3 = d3).
Note that by construction at a competitive equilibrium both selves of the represen-
tative agent face the same prices, i.e. the sophisticated representative agent at t = 1
must correctly forecast the asset price at t = 2.
Proposition 1. (Non existence). A competitive equilibrium with a sophisticated representa-
tive agent does not always exist.
In the following section we prove the proposition with a robust example.
3. AN EXAMPLE OF NON EXISTENCE
In this section we construct a robust example, where utility is increasing, smooth
and strictly concave, but where a competitive equilibrium with a sophisticated rep-
resentative agent does not exist. In this example at any fixed configuration of asset
prices, by backward induction, the representative agent at t = 1 anticipates how the
5demand of his future self at t = 2 for θ3 varies as a function of the amount of θ2 he
chooses to hold. The resulting induced preferences over θ2 at t = 1 are non-convex
and satiated. We, then, show that there is no market clearing asset price at t = 1 for
such an induced preference.
We begin by specifying the utility function at each t for the representative agent.
At t = 1 the utility function of the representative agent is:
(1) U1(c1, c2, c3) = (c1) + b ln(c2) + c ln(c3),
where b, c are strictly positive and smaller than 1.
We assume that the utility function of the representative agent at t = 2 generates
the following Indirect Addilog Utility Function:
(2) V2(p2, θ2) = α2
(θ2(p2 + d2))
β2
β2
+ α3
(θ2(p2 + d2)/p2)
β3
β3
,
where θ2(p2 + d2) is the wealth of the representative agent at t = 2. This class of in-
direct utility functions was introduced by Houthakker (1960). Expression (2) draws
on the work of Murthy (1982). Consistent with his assumptions we assume that the
underlying preference and wealth parameters take the following values:
(3) β2 = 1, β3 = −0.5, α2 = .6297714880, α3 = 1− .6297714880, d1 = d2 = d3 = 1.
de Boer, Bro¨cker, Jensen, and van Daal (2006) formally prove that when the β ′s are
strictly greater than 1 and the α’s add up to 1 the indirect utility function satisfies the
following properties:
(i) homogeneous of degree zero in p2 and θ2,
(ii) non-increasing in p2 and nondecreasing in θ2,
(iii) strictly quasi-convex in p2,
(iv) differentiable in p2 and θ2.
The fact that the indirect utility function is strictly quasi-convex in prices implies
that the direct utility function, i.e. the dual of (2), is strictly quasi-concave by a well
known result in duality theory 6.
Next we compute the asset demand functions at t = 2. Given that the utility
function at t = 2 is strictly quasi-concave, we can apply Roy’s Lemma and obtain:
(4) c2 =
α2(θ2(p2 + d2))
β2+1
α2(θ2(p2 + d2))β2 + α3(θ2(p2 + d2)/p2)β3
.
6See for example Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green (1995), page 66.
6It follows that as the period 2 budget constraint satisfied with the equality, the de-
mand for θ3 at t = 2 as a function of θ2, p2 is
(5) θ3(θ2, p2) =
θ2(p2 + d2)− c2
p2
.
Re-expressing c1, c2 and c3 through the three inter-temporal budget constraints (sat-
isfied in each case as an equality) we obtain the period 1 indirect utility function:
(6) V1(p1, p2, θ2) = p1 + d1 − p1θ2 + b ln((p2 + d2)θ2 − p2θ3(θ2, p2)) + c ln(d3θ3(θ2p2)).
Lemma 1. The market clearing price at t = 2 such that θ∗2 = θ
∗
3 = 1 is p
∗
2 = 0.2.
Proof. At the market clearing price vector it must be optimal for the representative
agent to demand θ∗2 = θ
∗
3 = 1. By computation it follows that the period 2 market
clearing price p∗2 satisfies the following equation:
(7) (p∗2 + 1)
3p∗2 = (α3/α2)
2.
Given that the utility function of the representative agent at t = 2 is strongly mono-
tone, the market clearing price at t = 2must be positive. By computation it is verified
that there exists only one positive solution to (7), namely p∗2 = 0.2 and this is the mar-
ket clearing price at t = 2. 
Lemma 2. There exists aK strictly positive such that whenever c/b > K then
∂V1(p1,p∗2,θ2)
∂θ2
<
0, ∀ θ2 ≥ 1, at each p1 ≥ 0.
Proof. Plugging the values of the parameters and p∗2 = 0.2 into (4) and (5) we can
re-express the demand for θ3 at t = 2, , given p
∗
2 = 0.2, as a function of θ2:
θ3(θ2, p
∗
2) =
.9068709427
√
θ2
.7557257856θ2 + .1511451571/
√
θ2
.
By computation note that
∂θ3(θ2,p∗2)
∂θ2
= −hy
2
(θ
3/2
2
− 2z
y
)
(yθ
3/2
2
+z)2
, where h = .9068709427, y =
.7557257856, z = .1511451571. Notice that hy is strictly positive as it is the denomina-
tor of the fraction, however as 2z < y, for θ2 ≥ 1, +θ3/22 − 2zy > 0. Hence, θ3 and c3 are
inferior commodities at t = 2 over some range of income.
7Substituting the expression for θ3(θ2, p
∗
2) into (6) we obtain the period 1 indirect
utility as a function of p1 and θ2 alone:
V1(p1, θ2) =(p1 + 1− p1θ2)a + b ln(1.2θ2 − .1813741885
√
θ2
.7557257856θ2 + .1511451571/
√
θ2
)+(8)
c ln(
.9068709427
√
θ2
.7557257856θ2 + .1511451571/
√
θ2
).
Let
p1 + 1− p1θ2 ≡ A,
b ln(1.2θ2 − .1813741885θ2
.7557257856θ
3/2
2 + .1511451571
) ≡ b ln(kθ2 − xθ2
yθ
3/2
2 + z
) ≡ B,
where k ≡ 1.2, x ≡ .1813741885, y ≡ .7557257856, z ≡ .1511451571,
c ln(
.9068709427θ2
.7557257856θ
3/2
2 + .1511451571
) ≡ c ln( hθ2
yθ
3/2
2 + z
) ≡ C,
where h ≡ .9068709427, y ≡ .7557257856, z ≡ .1511451571.
By computation notice that as long as p1 ≥ 0, ∂A∂θ2 ≥ 0, ∀ θ2 ≥ 1. Moreover
∂(B + C)
∂θ2
< 0 iff
c
b
> K(θ2) =
θ42ky
2 + θ
5/2
2 (2kyz + xy) + θ2(kz
2 − xz)
θ42ky + θ
5/2
2 (kyz − xy) + θ2(xz − kz2 − kz)
.
Observe that for any finite value of θ2 ≥ 1,K(θ2) is bounded andmoreover limθ2→+∞K(θ2) =
0, therefore there exists aK > 0 such that sup
θ2≥1
K(θ2) ≤ K. Therefore ∂(B+C)∂θ2 < 0 if cb >
K. It follows that at each p1 ≥ 0 there exists aK strictly positive such that whenever
c/b > K then
∂V1(p1,p∗2,θ2)
∂θ2
< 0, ∀ θ2 ≥ 1. 
Observe that we have to consider unbounded values of θ2 in lemma 2 as we allow
for the possibility that p2 = 0.
In the next lemma we want to allow for a negative asset price at t = 1. Observe
that the reason for this implicit in the calculations underlying lemma 2 it is that for
each p1 strictly positive, V1(p1, θ2) attains a maximum at some value θ2 < 1. Note that
in this case with p1 < 0 the budget constraint at t = 1 is: θ2 ≥ 1+d1/p1− c1/p1, which
imposes a lower bound on θ2.
Lemma 3. There exists p∗1 < 0 such that
∂V1(p∗1,p
∗
2
,θ2=1)
∂θ2
= 0, however lim
θ2→+∞
∂V1(p∗1,p
∗
2
,θ2)
∂θ2
=
−p∗1.
Proof. By computation observe that p∗1 =
∂(B+C)
∂θ2
|θ2=1 < 0. Moreover ∂V1(p
∗
1
,p∗
2
,θ2)
∂θ2
=
−p∗1 + ∂(B+C)∂θ2 . By computation ∂C∂θ2 = c
− 1
2
yθ
3/2
2
+z
y2θ4
2
+2yzθ
5/2
2
+z2θ2
≤ ∂(B+C)
∂θ2
< 0 (by lemma 2)
8as ∂B
∂θ2
≥ 0. As lim
θ2→+∞
∂C
∂θ2
= 0−, lim
θ2→+∞
∂(B+C)
∂θ2
= 0−. Therefore lim
θ2→+∞
∂V1
∂θ2
(p∗1, p
∗
2, θ2) =
−p∗1 > 0. 
In the next lemma, we show that θ2 = 1 is never an optimal choice even allowing
for a negative asset price at t = 1. In addition we also show that θ2 = 1 does not
belong to the convex hull of demand even allowing for a negative asset price at
t = 1. The latter statement implies that even if we re-interpret the model so that the
representative agent is a collection of a continuum identical individuals or we allow
for lotteries equilibrium existence is not restored.
Lemma 4. Given lemmas 1, 2, 3, θ2 = 1 is not an element of the convex hull of demand even
allowing for a negative asset price at t = 1.
Proof. Lemma 1 implies that with a sophisticated representative agent there is a
unique p∗2 candidate equilibrium price at period 2. For an equilibrium to exist, given
p∗2, there must be a p
∗
1 such that for the representative agent θ
∗
2 = 1 is a SS.
There are two cases to consider.
1. p1 ≥ 0: fix a (p1, p∗2), p1 ≥ 0, by lemma 2 θ2 = 1 is never an optimal solution.
Next, observe that a necessary condition for θ2 = 1 to be in the convex hull of indi-
vidual demand is that ∂V1
∂θ2
(p1, p
∗
2, θ
′
2) = 0 for some θ
′
2 < 1 and
∂V1
∂θ2
(p1, p
∗
2, θ
′′
2) = 0 for
some θ′′2 > 1, a possibility ruled out by lemma 2. It follows that θ2 = 1 is not in the
convex hull of individual demand.
2. p1 < 0: by lemma 3, in order to ensure that θ2 = 1 is chosen at t = 1 it nec-
essarily follows that the only candidate equilibrium price is p1 = p
∗
1. Further by
lemma 3 there exists θ2 > 1 such that for all θ2 > θ2,
∂V1
∂θ2
(p∗1, p
∗
2, θ2) > 0. Therefore
lim
θ2→+∞
V1(p
∗
1, p
∗
2, θ2) = lim
θ2→+∞
∫ θ2
θ
2
∂V1
∂θ2
(p∗1, p
∗
2, θ2)+V1(p
∗
1, p
∗
2, θ2) = +∞ as lim
θ2→+∞
∂V1
∂θ2
(p∗1, p
∗
2, θ2) =
−p∗1. It follows that at prices (p∗1, p∗2), θ2 = 1 cannot be an optimal choice for the rep-
resentative agent.
It remains to check that θ2 = 1 is not in the convex hull of demand when p1 <
0. By computation, observe that for any θˆ2 > 1, a necessary condition for θˆ2 to be
an optimal choice is that p1 = p
∗
1(θˆ2) =
∂(B+C)
∂θ2
|θˆ2 < 0. Moreover using arguments
analogous to lemma 3, it is verified that lim
θ2→+∞
∂V1(p∗1(θˆ2),p
∗
2
,θ2)
∂θ2
= −p∗1(θˆ2) and hence
lim
θ2→+∞
V1(p
∗
1(θˆ2), p
∗
2, θ2) = +∞. Therefore, there is no p1 < 0 for which there is some
θˆ2 > 1 such that θˆ2 is an optimal choice. It follows that θ2 = 1 cannot be in the convex
hull of individual demand. 
9Note that the above non existence result is robust to small variations in parameter
values by the continuity of the derivatives of the utility functions in these parame-
ters.
4. EQUILIBRIUM WITH NAIVE AGENTS
In this section we study equilibria with a naive representative agent.
Fix pt, t = 1, 2. When the representative agent is naive at t = 1, he does not antic-
ipate that at t = 2 consumption and asset choices will be re-optimized. Therefore at
t = 1 the representative agent solves
max
(c1,c2,c3,θ2,θ3)
u1(c1, c2, c3)
subject to:(9)
c1 + p1θ2 ≤ p1 + d1,
c2 + p2θ3 ≤ (p2 + d2)θ2,
c3 = d3θ3.
Let cˆt(p1, p2), t = 1, 2, 3 and θˆt(p1, p2), t = 2, 3 denote the unique solution (if it exists)
to the preceding maximization problem.
At t = 2 the representative agent solves
max
(c2,c3,θ3)
u2(c2, c3)
subject to:(10)
c2 + p2θ3 ≤ (p2 + d2)θˆ2,
c3 = d3θ3.
With a slight abuse of notation, the unique solution (if it exists) to the precedingmax-
imization problem is denoted by c˜t(p2, θˆ2(p1, p2)) = c˜t(p1, p2), t = 2, 3 and θ˜3(p2, θˆ2(p1, p2)) =
θ˜3(p1, p2).
The assumption that in every period the utility function is strictly monotone in
consumption implies that inter-temporal budget constraints are satisfied at equali-
ties in either maximization problem. As before, in a competitive equilibrium, it must
be optimal for both selves of the naive representative agent to hold the entire unit of
the asset in each period (θ1 = θ2 = θ3 = 1) and consumption must be equal to the
entire paid dividend in each period (c1 = d1, c2 = d2, c3 = d3).
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At this point we define two different notions of competitive equilibrium with a
naive representative agent.
Definition 3. A perfect foresight competitive equilibrium is a combination of prices (p′1, p
′
2)
and allocations (θ′1, c
′
1, θ
′
2, c
′
2, θ
′
3, c
′
3) such that c
′
1 = cˆ1(p
′
1, p
′
2), θ
′
2 = θˆ2(p
′
1, p
′
2), c
′
2 =
c˜2(p
′
1, p
′
2),θ
′
3 = θ˜3(p
′
1, p
′
2), c
′
3 = c˜3(p
′
1, p
′
2) and θ
′
1 = θ
′
2 = θ
′
3 = 1, c
′
1 = d1, c
′
2 = d2, c
′
3 = d3.
Definition 4. A temporary competitive equilibrium is a combination of prices (p′1, p
′
2, p
′′
2)
and allocations (θ′1, c
′
1, θ
′
2, c
′
2, θ
′
3, c
′
3) such that c
′
1 = cˆ1(p
′
1, p
′
2), θ
′
2 = θˆ2(p
′
1, p
′
2), c
′
2 =
c˜2(p
′
1, p
′′
2),θ
′
3 = θ˜3(p
′
1, p
′′
2), c
′
3 = c˜3(p
′
1, p
′′
2) and θ
′
1 = θ
′
2 = θ
′
3 = 1, c
′
1 = d1, c
′
2 = d2, c
′
3 = d3.
The following proposition establishes that although a perfect foresight competitive
equilibrium with a naive representative agent does not exist, a temporary competi-
tive equilibrium does.
Proposition 2. A competitive equilibrium with a naive representative agent does not exists,
however a temporary competitive equilibrium does.
Proof. At t = 1 as the utility function ut() of the representative agent is smooth and
strictly concave, θˆ2 = θˆ3 = 1 if and only if asset prices satisfy the following equations:
p′1 = (p
′
2 + d2)
∂u1
∂c1
(d1, d2, d3)
∂u1
∂c2
(d1, d2, d3)
,
p′2 = d3
∂u1
∂c3
(d1, d2, d3)
∂u1
∂c2
(d1, d2, d3)
.
Next, observe that at t = 2, θ˜3 = 1 if and only if asset prices satisfy the following
equations:
p′′2 = d3
∂u2
∂c3
(d1, d2, d3)
∂u2
∂c2
(d1, d2, d3)
.
As preferences are dynamically inconsistent
∂u1
∂c3
(d1,d2,d3)
∂u1
∂c2
(d1,d2,d3)
6=
∂u2
∂c3
(d1,d2,d3)
∂u2
∂c2
(d1,d2,d3)
and therefore
p′2 6= p′′2 . It follows that there are no prices (p′1, p′2) such that θˆ3(p′1, p′2) = θ˜3(p′1, p′2) = 1.
Therefore market clearing and individual optimization with a naive representative
agent are mutually incompatible if the asset price in the spot market at t = 2 is the
same as the forecast asset price at t = 1. Finally observe that if the representative
agent forecasts asset prices p′1,p
′
2 while the prevailing asset prices at t = 2 is p
′′
2, indi-
vidual optimization and market clearing are mutually compatible. 
11
REFERENCES
BARRO, R. J. (1999): “Ramsey Meets Laibson in the Neoclassical Growth Model,”
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 114(4), 1125–1152.
BLACKORBY, C., D. NISSEN, D. PRIMONT, AND R. RUSSELL (1973): “Consistent In-
tertemporal Decision Making,” Review of Economic Studies, 40, 239–248.
CAPLIN, A., AND J. LEAHY (2001): “Psychological Expected Utility and Anticipatory
Feelings,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 116, 55–79.
(2006): “The recursive approach to time inconsistency,” Journal of Economic
Theory, 131(1), 134–156.
DE BOER, P., J. BRO¨CKER, B. S. JENSEN, AND J. VAN DAAL (2006): “The-
oretical restrictions on the parameters of the indirect addilog system revis-
ited,” Econometric Institute Report EI 2006-11, Erasmus University Rotterdam:
http://people.few.eur.nl/pmdeboer/research/Restrictions6-11.pdf.
GOLDMAN, S. M. (1980): “Consistent Plans,” Review of Economic Studies, 47, 533–537.
HARRIS, C., AND D. LAIBSON (2001): “Dynamic Choices of Hyperbolic Consumers,”
Econometrica, 69, 935–957.
HERINGS, P., AND K. ROHDE (2006): “Time-inconsistent preferences in a general
equilibrium model,” Economic Theory, 29(3), 591–619.
KOCHERLAKOTA, N. R. (2001): “Looking for Evidence of Time-Inconsistent Prefer-
ences in Asset-Market Data,” Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Quarterly Review,
25, 13–24.
LAIBSON, D. (1997): “Golden Eggs and Hyperbolic Discounting,” Quarterly Journal
of Economics, 112, 443–477.
LUTTMER, E. G. J., AND T. MARIOTTI (2003): “Subjective Discounting in an Ex-
change Economy,” Journal of Political Economy, 111, 959–989.
(2006): “Competitive Equilibrium when Preferences Change over Time,”
Economic Theory, 27, 679–690.
LUTTMER, E. G. J., AND T. MARIOTTI (2007): “Efficiency and Equilibrium when
Preferences are Time-Inconsistent,” Journal of Economic Theory, 132(1), 493–506.
MAS-COLELL, A., M. D. WHINSTON, AND J. R. GREEN (1995): Microeconomic Theory.
Oxford University Press.
MURTHY, K. N. (1982): “Theoretcal restrictions on the parameters of the indirect
addilog demand equations – a comment.,” Econometrica, 50, 225–227.
12
PELEG, B., AND M. E. YAARI (1973): “On the Existence of a Consistent Course of
Action when Tastes Are Changing,” Review of Economic Studies, 40, 391–401.
POLLAK, R. A. (1968): “Consistent planning,” Review of Economic Studies, 35, 201–
208.
STROTZ, R. (1956): “Myopia and Inconsistency in Dynamic Utility Maximization,”
Review of Economic Studies, 23, 165–180.
